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ABSTRACT 
The hypothesis for the study was that the relationship based on referrer links and the number of hops to a 
malicious site could indicate the risk to another website. We chose Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
analysis as the method of comparing true positive and false positive rates for captured web traffic to test the 
predictive capabilities of our model. Known threat indicators were used as designators, and the Neo4j graph 
database was leveraged to map the relationships between other websites based on referring links. 
Using the referring traffic, we mapped user visits across websites with a known relationship to track the rate 
at which users progressed from a non-malicious website to a known threat. The results were grouped by the 
hop distance from the known threat to calculate the predictive rate. The results of the model produced true 
positive rates between 58.59% and 63.45% and false positive rates between 7.42% to 37.50%, respectively. 
The true and false positive rates suggest an improved performance based on the closer proximity from the 
known threat, while an increased referring distance from the threat resulted in higher rates of false positives.  
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of the research was to test a method of identifying risks to websites based on the relationship to 
known threats. Since a lag exists between identifying an instance of malware and propagation of the threat 
notifications, blacklists cannot provide a complete solution to identifying risks [1]. The rationale for the study 
was to test whether a risk could be predicted for non-malicious websites based on the proximity to malicious 
sites as determined by known threat indicators. In the current research, we sought a method of enhancing the 
existing threat indicators with additional metadata about the evaluation of risk based on relationships. 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) analysis [2] was used to evaluate the performance of predicting 
the risk of visiting websites based on the proximity to known malicious sites. We defined proximity as the 
number of hops to a known threat. ROC analysis allows researchers to evaluate models in medical trials, 
intrusion detection systems, and machine learning. Since ROC analysis has been used to evaluate the 
performance of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and other cybersecurity-related research [3], we 
concluded the method could provide an acceptable approach for testing binary classification of threats. 
 
ROC analysis can be used to evaluate multiple classes of a single model, and in our study, the classes were 
defined as the distance (in hops) from the known threat. By delineating threats based on the relationships to 
other websites, organizations could use the information to determine the threshold for acceptable risk. The 
acceptable risk would be based on the probability that a user visiting a website may follow a path to malicious 
content. 
2 Related Work 
Gyongyi, Garica-Molian, and Pedersen performed research [4] on a similar topic as the current study using 
the equivalent of Google PageRank to determine if a website should be classified as spam. The researchers 
focused the discussion on a method called TrustRank, which evaluated multiple indicators to assess the trust 
of a website. Wen, Zhao, and Yan presented similar research [5] as Gyongin et al. except the researchers 
analyzed the content of pages to determine whether the website should be classified as malicious. While both 
research studies presented similar topics as ours, the goal of the current study was to track activity across 
related websites to test the likelihood of predicting a user visiting a malicious website after entering other 
websites in the relationship. 
 
Rawal, Liang, Loukili, and Duan [6] focused on the research in the prior ten years of cyberattacks, the 
attacker’s patterns, and thus offered a tool to predict the subsequent moves of the attackers. This research 
aligns with our research in attempting to understand the next move of the attacker, which would provide an 
advantage to the organization under threat of attack. Rawal et al. proposed a mathematical model to predict 
cyberattacks. The information used for this model included an analysis of hundreds of cyberattacks from 
2000 to 2015. The researchers first identified who the possible attackers would be, including internal and 
external intruders, then reviewed the research to identify the top attack methods used. The top three attack 
vectors included Denial of Service (DoS), Cross-site Scripting (XSS), and Brute Force [6]. The results of 
their research suggest the need for a tool to predict when a user or organization is at risk of a cyberattack. 
 
Chiba, Tobe, Mori, and Goto [1] concurred with Rawal et al. [6] findings that web-based malware attacks 
are on the rise and considered a severe threat. Chiba et al. tested a method of blacklisting websites using IP 
characteristics [1]. This study is complementary to our research as we are not attempting to replace blacklists 
or common cybersecurity tools but to create a model that may aid in identifying malicious websites. Chiba 
et al. used two Internet Protocol (IP) characteristics of stability and address space characteristics to assist in 
the blacklisting of websites. The researchers were able to demonstrate the characteristics within the 
experimental use of their feature extraction model. A key takeaway from this research is the usage of a ROC 
curve and agreement that there is a need to develop a tool to detect malicious websites. While Chiba et al. 
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focused on specifically blacklisting of websites, our research focused on determining relationships between 
malicious websites. 
 
Bruijn and Janssen studied the difficulties in defining a framework for improving the communication of 
cybersecurity-related issues [7]. The researchers built an evidence-based framework to improve awareness 
of cybersecurity and improve perspectives for solving problems. Bruijn and Janssen identified four main 
issues in creating cybersecurity policies; intangible nature, socio-technical dependence, the ambiguous 
impact of a cyberattack, and defense against cyberattackers. The researcher focused on the inability to 
communicate risk to users about accessing websites. They also determined the need for creating policies to 
educate users on website safety. Our research goal was to develop a model which could provide users with 
risk-based alerts during browsing near malicious websites. The implementation of the model could aid 
organizations with the creation of policies and education for the end-users.  
 
Schwarz and Morris [8] determined that incorrect and misleading information on websites can have severe 
consequences for users. The researchers focused on the identification of credibility in web pages to aid users 
in assessing the validity of the content. This research is critical to our study, as it reinforces the value of 
flagging malicious websites to notify users. As Bruijn and Janssen stated, the human factor (or socio-technical 
aspects) of cybersecurity can be the most crucial in preventing a cyberattack [7]. Schwarz and Morris created 
a visualization of search results to help individuals determine the validity of a website [8]. Providing a tool 
to allow users to make the right choice when engaging website content [8], works in combination with our 
research; that users need to comprehend how close they may be to a malicious website. Our model aims to 
build on this idea by providing users the knowledge of how close they are to a malevolent web page. 
3 Method 
We designed the quantitative study to test a model for identifying risk to websites based on the relationship 
to known threat indicators. The general problem is that websites can include content from other sites that 
may load malicious data into a web browser and cause harm to users. The specific problem is known 
malicious website content can be blocked, but a safe site may load content from a threat which has not yet 
been labeled with an indicator in the last defense cybersecurity software. The purpose of the research was to 
describe a method of identifying risks to websites based on the relationship to known threats. 
 
For the study, the independent variable was a threat indicator to a known malicious website. The dependent 
variable was the relationship between websites inferred by the referring links between all the web traffic 
captured. For the same window of the captured data, blocked websites were extracted as the threat indicators 
and mapped as malicious websites. All websites in the captured traffic represented the population for the 
study and the websites with a relationship to malicious websites represented the sample of the population. 
Relationships were described as any path from a target website to a known malicious website. The 
relationships were limited to four “hops” from a website to a malicious site with a threat indicator. 
 
Threat indicators identify malicious websites, but based on the purpose of the study, we sought to test a 
method of identifying risks to users before they visited a malicious website. Predicting threats to users and 
averting risk provides a first-move advantage [6] and could reduce the potential risks to an organization. A 
website that loads content from another website represents a potential link one hop away. If a user clicks on 
a link to visit a new website, the new website could load data from a third website, which represents a risk 
two hops away.  
 
A website may contain relationships with multiple malicious sites at multiple hop lengths, so risks could be 
elevated based on not only the distance of the relationship but also the totality of the relationships. We did 
not attempt to establish a quantitative sum of the risk in the current study, but the topic is addressed in the 
future research section. For the study, the following hypothesis and null hypothesis were developed. 
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H = The relationship based on referrer links and the number of hops to a malicious site can indicate the risk 
to a website. 
H0 = A risk of visiting a website cannot be indicated by the relationship to known threats. 
 
3.1 Data Collection and Transformation 
Once the research design and method were developed, the extract, transformation, and load (ETL) process 
began. The data was repurposed from previously collected website traffic [9] and sanitized before ingesting 
into the databases. The website traffic was gathered from unencrypted network traffic using http-monitor tool 
[10] and written to a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) files. We developed a custom Python program to 
extract the domain, port, URI (Universal Resource Identifier), and referrer data points for ingest into the 
databases. The referrer represents the URI from the previous website, which leads to the current site. The 
URI for the original and referrer website was stripped of variables to sanitize any potentially sensitive content. 
The Python program transformed the content and populated the data into the Neo4j and MySQL databases. 
 
3.1.1 Instrumentation 
Data collection occurred over 21 days and was limited to the metadata of web traffic occurring on port 80 
since metadata from encrypted traffic cannot be extracted. The monitoring tool collected the metadata and 
web headers of 6,038,580 web traffic connections. We filtered the traffic destined for the websites of the 
organization to avoid capturing sensitive data. After filtering potentially sensitive data, the number of web 
traffic connections stored in the MySQL database was 3,735,355. The resulting traffic was stored in MySQL 
to support queries of domain association generated from the graph database. 
 
Neo4j was selected as the graph database for the research based on the popularity of the software and robust 
capabilities of existing Python modules. We leveraged the work of the Neomodel module [11] since the 
object-oriented design allowed for quick code development. All website domains were created as Website 
nodes in the database, and the referring website was also created as a Website node. A connection was created 
between the two nodes using the relationship name of Refers. All blocked domains during the time of the 
web traffic sampling were created as Indicator nodes, and a Threat relationship was established to the Website 
node. Figure 1 contains the nodes and relationships incorporated within the Neo4j database after the data was 
loaded. 
 
Figure 1: Neo4j populated nodes and relationships 
 
 
 5 
With all nodes created and relationships established, we could query the Neo4j database using the cypher 
query language. The following cypher code provides an example query used during the study to build 
relationships to malicious websites identified by threat indicator within three hops. 
 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ = (: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) − [: 𝑇𝐻𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇] → (: 𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒) ← 
     [: 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑆 ∗ 1. .3] − (: 𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ 
The Neo4j application provides a graphical visualizer capability to render the results of a query. Sample 
results from the above cypher query are included in Figure 2 to provide a visualization of all possible paths 
to a malicious website. 
 
Figure 2: Referrer hops to a malicious website 
  
Websites include referring links to other websites, and the hierarchy of associations can be plotted out to any 
number of “hops.” The term hop represents the number of links a user would need to click to arrive at the 
website under investigation. In Figure 2 the malicious website is labeled as “px.powe” and located on the 
middle-left with the incoming Threat relationship. 
 
As denoted in Figure 2, multiple paths exist to the malicious Website node. Two of the paths traverse 3-hop 
relationships, and seven paths involve a 2-hop relationship via the node denoted such as “csync.s.” The 
shortest number of hops does not denote the expected path a user will traverse, but additional research could 
test the number of relationships to determine the most likely path. Websites such as “healthza” in the top-
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right location represent nodes that have multiple paths to the malicious domain via 2-hop and 4-hop 
relationships. 
 
The cypher query execution identified a malicious Website node if it contains an Indicator with a Threat 
relationship. The website a user visits is indicated as a node that contains a Refers relationship with one to 
four hops of relationship to the malicious Website node. For example, the node on the top-right denoted as 
“www.go” represents the website the user wants to visit, and the node on the lower left in the figure denoted 
as “px.powe” with a Threat relationship represents the malicious website. Some of the nodes are annotated 
in the figure with the number of hops away from the desired website. The domain names are not fully 
annotated to provide some anonymity to the website traffic. 
 
3.1.2 Sampling 
For the current study, we were interested in associations to websites with known threat indicators. We relied 
on existing threat indicators from firewall software that blocked traffic to known malicious websites. All 
metadata for website traffic was captured, but the sampling for the study relied on malicious websites and 
derived relationships. 
While the relationships of the nodes were analyzed within the Neo4j database, we simultaneously loaded the 
same data into MySQL for alternate analysis methods. The same custom Python script performed the 
extraction of the data from the source JSON files before inserting it into the Neo4j and MySQL databases 
simultaneously. Both databases leverage different technical strengths, so Neo4j was used to express 
relationships, while MySQL was use relied on for the ability to combine and query objects. 
4 Results 
We loaded the captured data into Neo4j to build the relationships, then queried the same data in MySQL to 
track the paths of users through related websites. The results of the tracked paths of users populated a 
secondary database table in MySQL to facilitate the final analysis. We queried from the derived table to 
extract the data needed for the ROC analysis. 
 
Table 1 contains the results of the queried data, which was grouped by the number of hops the website was 
located from the known malicious site. In the table, False Positive (FP) represents all visitors to related 
websites who did not visit the final threat. False Negative (FN) represents direct visits to a threat that our 
model had no way of representing. True Positive (TP) represents all visitors to related websites who also 
visited the threat. True Negative (TN) represents all visits to websites that were not related to a known threat. 
Table 1: Summary of visits to websites 
Hop False Positive False Negative True Positive True Negative 
4 2406 159 276 6257 
3 1884 159 271 6257 
2 901 159 241 6257 
1 0 159 298 6257 
0 474 159 225 6257 
 
Note. The data represents the summation of the analysis of traffic visits and the association of websites to known threats. The 
hop column denotes the distance to a known threat with a hop of zero representing the threat. FP for 0-hop data represents 
direct visits to non-threat websites without any referring traffic. 
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Fawcett defined ROC analysis based on calculations from a confusion matrix [2] as depicted in Table 2. Each 
hop row of data provided input to a single confusion matrix, and the inclusion of all matrices represented the 
developed model for the current study. Each hop count analysis was evaluated independently, and no analysis 
was performed on all hop data as a summary of the model, but we provided further analysis of the data in the 
discussion section. 
 
Table 2: Confusion matrix [2] 
 
p n 
Y 
True 
Positives 
False 
Positives 
N 
False 
Negatives 
True 
Negatives 
Column 
totals: 
P N 
 
A confusion matrix contains the four possible outcomes for any instance with the true class represented by 
the columns and the hypothetical class represented by the rows [2]. For each of the hops in Table 1, we 
populated a confusion matrix and performed the ROC calculations. The results of the calculations are 
documented in Table 3. The calculations were performed based on common metrics suggested by Fawcett 
[2]. 
 
Table 3: Summary of ROC analysis 
Hop FP Rate TP Rate Precision Sensitivity Accuracy F-Measure 
4 0.375 0.635 0.103 0.635 0.719 0.177 
3 0.294 0.630 0.126 0.630 0.762 0.210 
2 0.140 0.603 0.211 0.603 0.860 0.313 
1 0.000 0.652 1.000 0.652 0.976 0.789 
0 0.074 0.586 0.321 0.586 0.911 0.415 
Note. The data in the table represents the results of the calculations from the confusion matrices. The FP and TP are used to 
graph the data while the remaining metrics provided the researchers with values to evaluate the certainty of the results. 
We did not calculate the negative predictive value for the data since the TN and FN values were static across 
all hop distances. The values were static since they were based on direct visits to known threats and visits to 
websites not related to known threats. The value for all hop distances for the negative predictive values was 
0.9752. The positive predictive value is denoted in Table 3 as the “Precision” value. 
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5 Discussion 
Zweig and Campbell explained that the graph of ROC performance would plot an improved accuracy model 
as tending toward the upper-left corner [12]. The upper-left corner represents a perfect result with a 100% 
TP rate and a 0% FP rate. Fawcett further explained that “conservative” classes would tend toward the left 
side of the graph, while more progressive classes tend toward the right side of the graph [2]. A difference 
between the two classes is related to the prediction of true positives with a higher willingness to accept 
increase false positive rates [2]. The graph of the ROC performance for the current study is depicted in Figure 
3. The dotted line represents x=y and denotes a model whereby the true positive and false positive rates are 
equal and, therefore, cannot accurately distinguish between true and false positive values. Predictive results 
can only provide a useful model by occurring above the dotted line. 
 
 
Figure 3: ROC performance graph based on distance from a threat 
The ROC performance of the 1-hop value does not conform to the pattern of the other hops and is due to the 
nature of the data collection. The website relationships were generated based on referring links from a known 
threat and subsequent referring links from derived relationships. Since the first hop from known threats was 
always visited links, no data could be derived from links to an unknown set. Our model of predicting risk to 
websites based on association to known threats can still provide value based on the hops of further distances. 
The issue of inconclusive results for 1-hop values was addressed in the future work section. 
 
The FP rate increased as the number of hops increased, which suggests that the further the relationships are 
from the original website, the less likely the model can predict threat. The conclusion appears to be valid 
since the further away a website is from the threat, the more possible paths exist; therefore, the more likely a 
user will follow an alternate path. The conclusion will not be valid for all websites since some content may 
provide a higher appeal, which could attract users at an increased rate compared to other content. When 
considering all websites as a unit, the likelihood of predicting a path to a malicious website appeared to be 
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reduced the further away a relationship was evaluated. More specifically, the false positive rate increased 
with the distance and may present an unacceptable model for organizations and the users. 
 
The model did not reveal substantial differences in the TP rate as the hop count relationships were increased. 
The FP rate did increase as the hop count relationship increased; therefore, the data suggests that sacrificing 
FP rates did not yield a substantial increase in predictive value. Specifically, the FP rate more than doubled 
from 2-hop to 3-hop relationships. The increased rate of blocked sites could increase user annoyance without 
providing a significant reduction in threat. Each organization would need to evaluate the user experience 
compared to threat reduction to determine the proper balance. 
 
The hypothesis for the current study was that the relationship based on referrer links and the number of hops 
to a malicious site could indicate the risk to a website. The null hypothesis for the current study was that the 
risk of visiting a website could not be indicated by the relationship to known threats. Since the analysis 
methods based on the hop distance to a known threat suggested a false positive and true positive rate which 
exceeded a random guess, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the hypothesis was accepted. 
 
While true positive rates in the study between 0.5859 and 0.6345 may not suggest an outstanding 
performance, the goal of the study was to develop metrics for enhancing existing capabilities. Cybersecurity 
products provide indicators to threats, but actions on the indicators are executed singularly without evaluating 
the relationships. Enhancing the performance of existing indicators with threat levels could provide users 
with additional information about the potential risk during browsing without necessitating a block of the 
network activity. 
6 Future Work 
The association and distance to a known threat could be used to develop a method for establishing the risk to 
non-malicious websites. Researchers could perform a future study to produce a numerical scale that 
corresponds to the risk to a website based on the number of relationships to known threats.  Like Gyongyi et 
al. definition of an oracle function [4], a website one hop from a malicious website may present a greater risk 
to a website two hops from a known risk. The calculations would need to assign values to the distance from 
a risk to determine if, for example, a website with two relationships to a known threat at a distance of two 
hops is worse than a website with one hop from a known threat. 
 
Once researchers can describe the calculation of risk for websites based on relationships, a scale could be 
developed to quantify the threat. The scale could limit the results to a known set such as between one and 10 
and thresholds be developed for ranges. If the evaluation of the risk model were implemented in a product, 
an organization could set the threshold for various ranges with actions for each range. For example, threat 
values below five would not produce any notification to users, but values between five and seven would 
inject a warning notification that a user was browsing near known threats. Finally, values above seven would 
trigger a block of traffic since the risk of a user visiting a malicious site was very likely to occur. Each 
organization could evaluate the scale to determine the acceptable risk based on business needs. 
 
As stated in the discussion section, the method of data collection produced skewed results for 1-hop 
relationships. To avoid the problem and test the model again, researchers could build the relationships of 
websites based on a web crawl. The web crawl would process web page content, identify links, and build 
relationships based on the links versus our method of building relationships based on user web traffic. The 
links would then be followed to build the relationships of the sites to be studied. This method would require 
collecting web traffic and sampling only the website visits which corresponded to domains within existing 
relationships. 
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